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Between De Dicto and De Re: De Objecto Attitudes 
Manuel Rebuschi and Tero Tulenheimo 
Abstract. Hintikka’s second generation epistemic logic introduces a syntactic device allowing to 
express independence relations between certain logical constants. De re knowledge attributions 
can be reformulated in terms of quantifier independence. However, the reformulation does not 
extend to non-factive attitudes like belief. There, formulas with independent quantifiers serve to 
express a new type of attitude, intermediate between de dicto and de re, to be dubbed as attitudes 
de objecto: in each possible world compatible with the agent’s belief, there is an individual with 
the specified property – the same individual in each world (contrast with de dicto), while the 
individual need not exist actually (unlike with de re). We discuss the philosophical benefits of our 
analysis of propositional attitudes. We propose a refined account of the behaviour of proper names 
as well as of indefinite and definite descriptions in attitude reports. Some remarks about perception 
and the hallucination argument are also presented. 
Keywords. de dicto and de re, intentional objects, thought with no object, hallucination argument, 
quantified epistemic logic, independence-friendly logic. 
1. A new formalism for attitudes
The de dicto / de re distinction is a well-known tool to account for fine-grained 
analyses of propositional attitude ascriptions. Using Quine-style examples, if 
Ralph knows (de dicto) that someone is a spy, he is not thereby committed to 
know (de re) of someone that he or she is a spy.1 Thus, the ambiguity of the 
statement ‘Ralph knows that someone is a spy’ results in two possible 
formalizations within standard epistemic logic:2  
(1) KR $x (x is a spy) de dicto 
(2) $x KR (x is a spy), de re 
1 W.V.O. Quine, ‘Quantifiers and Propositional Attitudes’, Journal of Philosophy, 53 
(1956), pp. 177–187. 
2 J. Hintikka, Knowledge and Belief: An Introduction to the Logic of the Two Notions 
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1962). 
[Penultimate version (2011). Published in The Philosophical Quarterly Vol.61, No 245 828-838. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9213.2011.701.x]
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where the epistemic operator KR stands for ‘Ralph knows that’. So the distinction 
appears to be basically a matter of relative scopes between the epistemic operator 
and the existential quantifier, and Quine would insist that quantifying-in like in (2) 
is dubious. In the de dicto interpretation, the whole dictum is in the scope of the 
epistemic operator, whereas the existential quantifier gets the wide scope in the de 
re reading. 
Hintikka and Sandu proposed a new formulation of this distinction in terms of 
informational independence between quantifiers.3 Their approach leads to an 
extension of first-order epistemic logic which can be called independence-friendly 
(IF) epistemic logic. Independent (existential) quantifiers have an obvious 
meaning: they encode the idea of a choice made uniformly with respect to one or 
more antecedent choices of values. The independence of $y vis-à-vis "x, say, is 
syntactically indicated by using the informational independence marker (the slash 
notation): ($y/"x). For a simple example which uses only quantifiers and no 
epistemic operators, in  
(3) "x $y (y is greater than x), 
the choice of a value for y may depend on that for x, whereas in 
(4) "x ($y/"x) (y is greater than x), 
the value of y must be chosen independently of the choice for x, i.e., the same 
value of y must be chosen no matter which value is assigned to x. The semantics 
of (4) may be explicated by noting that its truth amouts to the existence of a 
function f which is uniform in its sole argument and satisfies 
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 (5) for every a in the domain, f(a) is greater than a. 
The uniformity of f means that for any two objects a and b in the domain, we have 
f(a) = f(b). That is, the value of f is constant. 
As a matter of fact, some formulas involving the independence marker can be 
expressed without it; e.g., the truth of (4) is equivalent to that of 
(6) $y "x (y is greater than x). 
Indeed, since the value of y in (4) must be constant, this value may be chosen 
before that of "x, which is what (6) states. In connection with other formulas, 
again, the independence marker cannot be dispensed with; cases in point are 
certain attitude reports that will be discussed below.4 
Going back to knowledge ascriptions, the de re reading can be formulated in 
terms of informational independence: 
(7) KR ($y/KR) (y is a spy).    de re 
In this formula, the value of the quantifier $y may not vary with the interpretation 
of KR, but must be independent of the world chosen for KR in the evaluation. In 
order to better understand the meaning of (7), recall first that semantically 
epistemic operators are relativized quantifiers. In particular, KR is a universal 
quantifier ranging over those possible worlds that are compatible with all that 
Ralph actually knows (accessible worlds, epistemic alternatives). Just like formula 
                                                                                                                                
3 J. Hintikka and G. Sandu, ‘Informational Independence as a Semantical Phenomenon’, 
in J.E. Fenstad, I.T. Frolov, and R. Hilpinen (eds.), Logic, Methodology and Philosophy 
of Science, Vol. 8 (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1989), pp. 571–589.  
4 Examples using only quantifiers, not epistemic operators, can be found, e.g., in J. 
Hintikka, The Principles of Mathematics Revisited (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1996), ch. 9. 
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(4) requires the value of y to be chosen uniformly with respect to the value of x, 
also formula (7) imposes a corresponding uniformity requirement: that the value 
of y be chosen uniformly with respect to the world w chosen for KR. What the 
formula (7) states, then, can be expressed as follows: for every accessible possible 
world, one can pick out an individual (the value of y) such that this individual is a 
spy and the same value of y can be chosen regardless of which epistemic 
alternative is considered. To put it in other words, one and the same individual can 
be used as a witness of the existential quantifier for every accessible possible 
world. We note that the truth-condition of (7) can be phrased in terms of functions 
explicating how existential quantifiers are witnessed – recall how the truth-
condition of (4) was explicated above. The truth of (7) amounts to the existence of 
a function g which is uniform in its sole argument – i.e., satisfies g(w) = g(v) for 
any two epistemic alternatives w and v – and meets the following condition: 
 (8) for every accessible world w, g(w) is a spy at w.  
Note that the uniformity requirement means that the value of g is the same for 
every world. Hintikka has labeled epistemic logic with independent quantifiers 
second-generation.5 While there are no markers for informational independence in 
natural languages, ambiguous epistemic attitude ascriptions can be disambiguated 
in a straightforward way by using formalizations such as (7).  
2. A new kind of attitude  
An important issue, already mentioned earlier, is that many formulas of IF 
epistemic logic are equivalent to standard formulas – even though some of them 
                                               
5 J. Hintikka, ‘A Second-Generation Epistemic Logic and Its General Significance’, in 
V.F. Hendricks, K.F. Jørgensen, and S.A. Pedersen (eds.), Knowledge Contributors 
(Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2003), pp. 33–55. 
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are not. For instance, the formulas of the de re ascription of knowledge to Ralph, 
(2) and (7), are equivalent. Now, the point of interest for us is that this is a mere 
coincidence, due to the factivity of the epistemic operator KR. Factivity of an 
operator £ is defined via the axiom schema £j ® j (known as the schema T), or 
equivalently by the semantic requirement that the correlated accessibility relation 
be reflexive. Assuming that (7) is true in the actual world, there is an individual 
such that this one and the same individual can be picked out in every accessible 
possible world. By factivity, one of those accessible worlds is the actual one. 
Hence the truth of (7) entails that of (2). Obviously (2) entails (7) as well. But 
what if one considers non-factive attitudes, like belief? Here there is no longer 
equivalence between the formulas corresponding respectively to (2) and (7). As a 
consequence, IF epistemic logic leads us to discern a third variety of attitudes, 
irreducible to and intermediate between the two already familiar ones. We will 
call them de objecto attitudes. The idea is clear from an example: 
(9) BR $x (x is a spy)    de dicto 
(10) BR ($x/BR) (x is a spy)   de objecto 
(11) $x BR (x is a spy),    de re 
where the doxastic operator BR stands for ‘Ralph believes that’. The pictures 
below illustrate the differences in the truth-conditions of the three formulas, 
evaluated at the world w which has two doxastic alternatives w' and w''. Each 
character is a spy in the world it inhabits. The characters that look the same 
represent the same individual, those that look different, represent distinct 
individuals.  
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As far as we know, this irreducibility of (10) to (11) has not been previously 
noticed. Kraut intends to formalize ‘attitudes toward nonexistent entities’ without 
ontological commitment to those objects. He introduces an ad hoc semantics to 
capture simple cases of attitudes analogous to the de objecto ones, with quantifiers 
semantically independent of the doxastic operator in whose syntactic scope they 
stand. Kraut’s ideas can be expressed in a more systematic way by using the 
framework discussed in the present paper.6 Indeed, having available formulas like 
(10) appears to offer a very promising formal tool and helps to refine our analysis 
of propositional attitudes: 
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(i) Having a de objecto belief does not imply having a de re one: this means that 
the independent quantifier ($x/BR) induces in general no ontological commitments 
regarding the actual world. De objecto beliefs involve Brentanian ‘intentional’ or 
‘in-existent’ objects, not real things. Crucially, they are nonetheless beliefs 
pertaining to an object. If Ralph believes de dicto that someone is a spy, it may 
well be compatible with all he believes that N is a spy in the doxastic world w1, 
that M is a spy in the doxastic world w2, etc. De objecto beliefs, on the other hand, 
pertain to the same object in each of the worlds compatible with all that Ralph 
believes. 
Reasoning as follows, one might raise the question of how common de objecto 
beliefs can be: if it is compatible with the beliefs of an agent C that a certain 
individual N is a spy (this fact corresponding to the inclusion of a certain world w 
among the agent’s doxastic alternatives), should not we say that it will be equally 
compatible with C’s beliefs that N itself does not exist while a sufficiently similar 
but numerically distinct individual M exists and is a spy? It is not our goal to 
pronounce on relative frequencies of different types of propositional attitudes as 
these occur among real-life agents; we are simply making conceptual distinctions. 
But it should be noted that if the agents’ doxastic alternatives were systematically 
closed under adding worlds with distinct but similar individuals, then not only 
attitudes de objecto, but also attitudes de re, would never occur. Those 
philosophers who do not have any outright reason to dismiss beliefs de re, will 
presumably not find in the reasoning just described any compelling ground for 
dismissing beliefs de objecto.  
                                                                                                                                
6 R. Kraut, ‘Attitudes and Their Objects’, Journal of Philosophical Logic, 8 (1979), pp. 
197–217. 
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(ii) Not only beliefs, but all non-factive attitudes like desire, fear,… admit of a de 
objecto variant. Actually, the latter can be considered as a basic kind of attitude 
and be extended to factive ones (like knowing, seeing,…): in the presence of 
factivity, it coincides with the corresponding de re attitude. Semantically, de re 
attitudes are a special case of de objecto attitudes.  
(iii) Being unable to distinguish an intermediate case between de dicto and de re 
beliefs is a tricky situation: one cannot ascribe an attitude directed towards a 
nonexistent object and is forced to reduce it to an attitude towards a dictum – 
which is obviously misleading.7 Our proposal enables one to deal with singular 
thoughts, even when there is no actual object towards which such thoughts are 
directed.  
It appears possible to represent de objecto beliefs in terms of such free modal 
logics that allow as inhabitants of every possible world objects of two kinds: 
existent and nonexistent.8 We take it to be a considerable advantage of our 
approach that it avoids postulating nonexistent individuals, and thus departs from 
Meinongianism. 
In Sections 3 and 4, we will use our new three-case classification to account for 
attitudes involving indefinite or definite descriptions, as well as proper names. In 
Section 5 we present a few remarks about perception. 
                                               
7 O. Asheim, ‘Creatures of Imagination and Belief’, Nordic Journal of Philosophical 
Logic, 1 (1996), pp. 61–78. 
8 Cf., e.g., G. Priest, Towards Non-Being. The Logic and Metaphysics of Intentionality 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). 
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3. Application to descriptions 
It is well known since Russell’s 1905 ‘On Denoting’ that descriptions can have 
narrow or wide scope relative to attitude verbs.9 These directly correspond to the 
de dicto / de re contrast in readings of ambiguous sentences like: ‘I want to eat a 
cake’ (either indefinite, or definite), or ‘I want to kiss the winner’ (either the 
winner whoever she is, or the winner already fixed). With proper names like 
‘George’ in ‘I want to beat George’, no such ambiguity is usually considered, the 
narrow scope option being ruled out at the outset: either one is a descriptivist and 
the corresponding quantifier has the wide (de re) interpretation, or one is a direct 
referentialist and the proper name is assumed to be a rigid designator, being 
thought of as exhibiting a wide scope. An exception is provided by certain 
specific uses of proper names in sentences like ‘I believe that a certain Mr. Plop 
will come’. In such contexts they behave like narrowly interpreted descriptions. 
Of course, classical problems arise with empty proper names. If Leon believes 
that Santa Claus received his letter, the empty proper name ‘Santa Claus’ cannot 
be given a wide (de re) interpretation, and the whole attitude should consequently 
(or so it seems) be interpreted like a de dicto one. However, it appears that there is 
a huge difference between this attitude, and an attitude towards a half-definite 
individual, say Leon believing that the guy who will bring presents at Christmas, 
whoever he is, received his letter.  
The issue can be rephrased with definite descriptions, by using Donnellan’s 
distinction between their attributive and referential uses.10 Let us consider a 
                                               
9 B. Russell, ‘On Denoting’, Mind, 14 (1905), pp. 479–493. 
10 Cf. K.S. Donnellan, ‘Reference and Definite Descriptions’, The Philosophical Review, 
77 (1966), pp. 281–304. 
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complex predicate S for ‘being a red-dressed and kind guy with a long white 
beard’, assuming that Santa Claus would be the only possible individual fitting 
the description ‘the S’. (For us, possible individuals are individuals that exist in 
some other possible world, instead of being nonexistent denizens of the actual 
world.) One can now consider the following two attitudes: 
(12) BL $x ("y (Sy « y = x) & x received Leon’s letter)  de dicto 
(13) $x BL ("y (Sy « y = x) & x received Leon’s letter). de re 
These attitudes could be expressed by Leon himself by using the description ‘the 
S’, (12) corresponding to an attributive use and (13) to a referential use.11 Like for 
empty proper names, a referential use of a description without any available 
referent seems impossible. However, one can actually imagine many cases where 
people make referential use of empty descriptions. 
For instance, one can consider two drunkards: Nob, pointing to an empty point in 
the street, and saying: ‘Hey Bob, did you see that strange cat?’, and Bob, pointing 
to the same empty point, answering: ‘Hey Nob, you must be drunk, it’s a cow!’. A 
less poetic example can be provided by an academic shouting: ‘Eureka, I have the 
proof!’, while two years later, the same person would confess: ‘I made a mistake, 
it was not a proof’. Other cases worth considering are those of future individuals, 
like a house a couple intends to build, or a submitted scientific project: thoughts 
are then focused onto very specific objects (‘our house’, or ‘our project’), even 
though not actual ones. 
                                               
11 See B. Abbott, ‘Attributive, Referential, De Dicto and De Re’, unpublished manuscript, 
2000, retrieved February 9, 2011, from http://semanticsarchive.net/Archive/DU3YTgyN/. 
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The question of empty descriptions pertains to a more general issue about singular 
thoughts. If there is no further choice beyond de dicto and de re attitudes, then one 
cannot account for attitudes focusing on a nonexistent (intentional) object. Hence 
a thought directed to a nonexistent object could not be a singular thought, but 
would be automatically construed as a general thought. And if only general 
thoughts could be used to construe attitudes seemingly directed to nonexistent 
objects, this would suggest (i) that one cannot use empty proper names, unless 
they are reduced to narrow-scoped definite descriptions, and (ii) that one cannot 
make referential use of a definite description to refer to a nonexistent object.  
As pointed out above, de objecto attitudes can be viewed as involving singular 
thoughts directed to (possibly nonexistent) intentional objects. Expressing such 
attitudes, e.g. beliefs, in natural language is thus expected to enable one to make 
referential use of descriptions, and to use proper names, even though there is 
nothing to be referred to in the actual world. 
Making referential use of a definite description is easily represented by the 
formula: 
(14) BL ($x/BL) ("y (Sy « y = x) &  
    x received Leon’s letter). de objecto 
More precisely, if Leon believes de objecto of the S that he received his letter, 
then Leon can use the very description ‘the S’ in a referential way to designate his 
intentional object. If this explanation is correct, then making referential use of a 
description does not require that the object being referred to actually exist.  
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4. Application to proper names 
The case of empty proper names needs perhaps more argumentation. We wish to 
keep our framework general and do not assume that all proper names are rigid 
designators (have the same individual as their extension in all worlds). In a 
possible world w the extension of a given proper name is an individual from the 
domain of w. Its extension in another possible world may or may not be that same 
individual. Now, if the reader is a supporter of descriptivism, then the puzzle 
about empty proper names is easily solved along the lines of Section 3, for then 
proper names are supposed to hide definite descriptions; indeed, a given belief 
entertained by Leon about Santa Claus is then construed as the corresponding de 
objecto belief about the S. 
For opponents to descriptivism, an account of empty proper names is expected to 
be independent of the solution for empty descriptions. In our logical 
representation, we will not resort to quantifiers but, at a first stage, to an 
individual constant – let us say ‘s’ for ‘Santa Claus’. To begin with, it should be 
noted that in connection with a sentence like ‘Leon believes that Santa Claus 
received his letter’, which is formalized by 
(15) BL (s received Leon’s letter),  
one cannot maintain that ‘s’ has the widest scope; so ‘s’ cannot be a Kripkean 
rigid designator. Yet, if one agrees that ‘s’ should be a flexible designator when 
put in the scope of BL, it is not settled which kind of belief (de dicto or de objecto) 
is expressed by formula (15).  
In order to decide exactly which attitude is represented by (15), we must check 
which kind of existential generalization would be allowed. As it seems, no 
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additional condition is needed to allow the narrowest case of generalization, 
corresponding to a de dicto belief: 
(16) BL $x (x received Leon’s letter).  de dicto 
Now, even according to authors like Loar or Recanati, who claim that proper 
names can be used opaquely in doxastic contexts (i.e., that the substitution 
principle can fail in such contexts), proper names must always be subject to 
existential generalization in the usual sense.12 It means that (15) should entail 
(17) $x BL (x received Leon’s letter),  de re 
which is false as long as Santa Claus does not exist. Rather than allowing 
existential generalization in such form, we shall follow Hintikka who discerns a 
specific precondition which must be explicitly available in order for an existential 
generalization to be permitted, namely that there be an individual (in the actual 
world) such that Leon believes of that individual that he is Santa Claus:13 
(18) $x BL (x = Santa Claus). 
Of course, since there is no such individual, one cannot infer (17) from (15). 
However, we can formulate a new principle of (intermediate) existential 
generalization which suits our new kind of attitudes. From a belief that an 
individual c is a P (symbolically B Pc), one cannot only infer the de dicto belief 
that someone is a P (in symbols B $x Px); if the believer considers c as a definite 
                                               
12 See B. Loar, ‘Reference and Propositional Attitudes’, The Philosophical Review, 81 
(1972), pp. 43–62; F. Recanati, Oratio Obliqua, Oratio Recta (Cambridge, Mass.: The 
MIT Press, 2000). 
13 Cf., e.g., J. Hintikka, Models for Modalities (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1969), pp. 121–127. 
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intentional object, then the generalization can be more specific, i.e., it can be a de 
objecto one. This can be summed up by using Hintikka-style formulas: 
(19)  B Pc,   B ($x/B) (x = c)     Þ     B ($x/B) Px. 
Seeking a uniform treatment of proper names in doxastic contexts suggests that 
the de objecto interpretation extends from the case of empty proper names (like 
‘Santa Claus’) to genuine proper names (like ‘Jaakko Hintikka’). It means that 
whenever we employ a proper name to designate an individual, existing or not, we 
basically express a singular thought to be classified as a de objecto attitude. If the 
individual happens to exist, then the thought so expressed amounts to a de re 
attitude. De objecto beliefs are thus primitive beliefs, whereas de re beliefs only 
constitute a derived kind, accidentally prevailing when the corresponding de 
objecto beliefs are about actually existing objects. 
5. Application to hallucination and perception 
The new kind of attitude can provide interesting insights into the philosophical 
debates about perception. According to the hallucination argument, intermediate 
entities – namely sense data – should play some role in perception. Indeed, if one 
perceives an object, one’s internal experience cannot be distinguished from a 
hallucination where there is no object in the world corresponding to the 
experience. Therefore, still according to this argument, we would need to assume 
that perception is not directly about external objects, but that there are 
intermediate intentional objects like sense data.  
However, in our opinion there is no need here for a new species of objects. We 
agree with Crane’s minimalist account of intentional objects: ‘[B]eing an 
intentional object is not being a thing of any kind. For “intentional object” in this 
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respect (unsurprisingly) is like “object of attention” rather than “physical object”. 
… Rather, an intentional object is just the object (for some subject) of an 
intentional state or act.’14 Intentional objects are merely objects of de objecto 
attitudes. Our account implies that in connection with any propositional attitude 
verb A, one should distinguish between three cases, namely de re, de objecto and 
de dicto (going from the strongest to the weakest one): 
(20) $x A Px   de re  
(21) A ($x/A) Px    de objecto 
(22) A $x Px.    de dicto 
But as soon as one considers a factive attitude verb (like: perceive, see, hear,…), 
de objecto and de re cases are immediately equivalent: 
(23) If A is factive, then:  $x A Px  Û  A ($x/A) Px. 
Indeed, if A is factive, then the actual world is among the worlds that are, 
actually, compatible with this attitude. So if an individual exists in every A-
alternative (i.e., in each of those compatible worlds), it also exists in the actual 
world. 
Whereas the hallucination argument postulates internal entities to account for 
intentional objects, our proposal shows that no categorical distinction between 
internal and real-world entities is needed. One and the same object can very well 
appear as the object of a non-factive de objecto attitude on the one hand and as the 
object of a factive de objecto attitude on the other. The difference lies in the set of 
epistemic alternatives, not in the entities concerned. A hallucination is a case of a 
de objecto attitude about a nonexistent intentional object, whereas a veridical 
                                               
14 T. Crane, ‘Intentional Objects’, Ratio, 14:4 (2001), pp. 298–317. 
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perception is a de objecto attitude about an actually existing object, that is, a de re 
attitude, and it involves no intermediate entity such as a sense datum. While 
hallucinations can track their own objects, they do not contaminate perception 
with supplementary intentional entities.  
6. Conclusion 
Semantically, de re attitudes are a special case of de objecto attitudes. The former 
are just like the latter when these are factive. An object of belief is the target of a 
de objecto attitude; if the object of the belief happens to actually exist, then the 
very same object is the target of a de re attitude.  
Intentional objects are just values of variables bound by existential quantifiers 
which stand in the syntactic scope of an attitude verb/operator while being 
semantically independent of it. Intentional objects are thus nothing more than that, 
in any thick ontological sense. Any object which exists in some possible world 
may in suitable circumstances be an intentional object. (Circumstances are 
suitable when the object exists in all possible worlds compatible with the relevant 
agent’s propositional attitude.) Our proposal does not force us to admit of 
nonexistent objects among the objects inhabiting a world. The objects of de 
objecto attitudes need not exist in the actual world; what makes them specific is 
that they appear in connection with an attitude that pertains to a fixed object, 
existing in all the relevant possible worlds.  
With an intermediate case between de re and de dicto we can propose solutions to 
issues about empty proper names and about referring to nonexistent objects, and 
we are in a position to formulate an objection to the hallucination argument. Other 
17 
cases like anaphoric linking with no real antecedent, or Hob-Nob sentences,15 will 
require future investigation. Let us close the paper by a brief note on cases of the 
latter kind. First recall the semantics of the actuality operator ACT. We take it that 
a world w0 (the ‘actual world’) has been fixed once and for all. Then, if w is any 
world, the semantic clause for ACT lays it down that ACT j holds at w iff j holds 
at the designated world w0.16 Extending the expressive resources of our 
symbolism by the actuality operator, the truth-conditions of at least some cases of 
Hob-Nob sentences become expressible. For example, the logical form of the 
sentence ‘Nob believes that a witch Hob believes to exist, is angry’ is as follows:  
 (24) BHob ($x/BHob) [witch(x)  &  ACT BNob angry(x)]. 
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